

NSC BRIEFING

10 July 1957

**SOVIET LEADERSHIP: IMPLICATIONS FOR EXTERNAL POLICY**

- I. Khrushchev now has gained complete control over foreign and Satellite policy.
  - A. However, his reaffirmation of the 20th Party Congress line, his violent condemnation of the defeated leaders for blocking disarmament, peaceful coexistence, and rapprochement with Yugoslavia, and his apparent acceptance of the doctrine of "separate roads to Socialism" restrict his freedom of action.
  - B. After he has consolidated his power, however, a more energetic and imaginative application of these policies can be expected as a result of the elimination of the conservative Molotov faction, which may have actually imposed restraints on foreign policy decisions.
    1. Mikoyan said on 4 July, "Everything will be the same, only better."
    2. Khrushchev said on 6 July, "We shall even more determinedly work for the easing of tensions in relations between states."
  - C. We expect Khrushchev to exploit the purge of the conservative members of the presidium to revive his campaign for top-level bilateral meetings with Free World leaders, one of the specific policies Molotov was accused of opposing.
  - D. Disarmament negotiations in London may well become a testing ground for any new Soviet approaches to foreign policy problems.

1. No indication yet that Moscow intends to make any significant move toward compromise with the Western position.
2. It would be characteristic of Khrushchev, however, to follow up Zorin's 8 July statement with some spectacular move, such as a call for a top-level conference on disarmament.
3. Khrushchev may even feel such move necessary to justify his action against Molotov and Co.

II. Perhaps more than in any other area of foreign policy, Molotov's removal will affect Moscow's turbulent relations with Yugoslavia.

- A. The vacillation and inconsistency in Soviet-Yugoslav relations in recent months, with friendly and hostile sentiments alternately appearing in the press and public statements, indicate that it was this issue above all others that separated the two factions on matters of foreign policy.
- B. With the Molotov faction removed, Khrushchev probably will initiate a change in this relationship through strong efforts to improve relations with Tito, possibly including a trip to Belgrade.
  1. Moscow radio already has declared that "now that the anti-party work of the Malenkov-Kaganovich-Molotov group has been exposed, a series of obstacles will be removed from the road of further improvement in Soviet-Yugoslav relations."
- C. With the victory of "their man Khrushchev," the Tito regime anticipates the successful implementation of the Belgrade and Moscow declarations of 1955 and 1956.

- D. While a number of fundamental Soviet-Yugoslav differences remain, particularly with respect to the satellites, Khrushchev may well take measures to clamp down on Satellite criticism of Yugoslavia and re-establish exchanges on lower levels.

III. A genuine reconciliation with Yugoslavia, which must be reached primarily on Tito's terms, will not make dealings with the Satellite states any easier.

- A. Recent Chinese doctrinal pronouncements and the ability of the Gomulka regime to follow its own course have encouraged dissidents in the Satellites--so called "revisionists" who advocate liberalization of Communist policies.

1. These revisionists will be further heartened by Khrushchev's return to the 20th Congress line, encouraging "separate roads to socialism."

2. Thus, there will be a renewal of pressures within the Satellites for the kind of independence from Soviet control which Gomulka has achieved.

3. However, Soviet-Polish relations will probably improve.

- B. A series of courtesy visits by the Soviet leaders to the various Satellites is likely. Khrushchev and Bulganin have already arrived in Czechoslovakia where they were received with "spontaneous" demonstrations of welcome.

- C. Soviet purge immediately echoed in Rumania--the only orthodox Satellite which appears to have followed consistent Khrushchev line--where two Stalinist Politburo members (Chisinevski and Constantinescu) relieved of top party posts, for reasons similar to those given for expulsion in USSR.

D. However, most top men in orthodox Satellites appear safe--all hailed Soviet move, all reaffirmed complete allegiance to Moscow.

1. But press reaction in East Germany revealed party is nervous, was at least temporarily uncertain as to future of Stalinist boss Ulbricht. East German comment now denies any changes to take place.
2. Hungarian party caught off guard--had just completed Party Conference which had spelled out hard line, ignored Soviet 20th Party Congress. Now, Hungarian party praising 20th Party Congress to the skies.
3. In Warsaw, Gomulka's position strengthened, many Natolinists, fearing purge, may now drop their opposition to his programs.

E. This softer line in Satellites and Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement will intensify dilemma USSR has faced since 20th Party Congress--how to control Satellites and still give them some freedom of action.

IV. Peiping, which was advised of the purge through diplomatic channels in advance of the public announcements, responded favorably in a brief message to the CPSU.

A. Peiping's cable was similar to later reactions from North Korea and North Vietnam, and expressed confidence that the action "will help unite and consolidate" the Soviet party.

B. Khrushchev's move will clearly get Peiping's support. The Chinese in the past year have implied they would welcome removal of the remaining Stalinists in the USSR and Satellites.